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Attempts at modifying public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs range
from advertising and schooling to “brainwashing.” Their effective-
ness is highly controversial. In this paper, we use survey data on anti-
Semitic beliefs and attitudes in a representative sample of Germans
surveyed in 1996 and 2006 to show that Nazi indoctrination––with
its singular focus on fostering racial hatred––was highly effective.
Between 1933 and 1945, young Germans were exposed to anti-Se-
mitic ideology in schools, in the (extracurricular) Hitler Youth, and
through radio, print, and film. As a result, Germans who grew up
under the Nazi regime are much more anti-Semitic than those born
before or after that period: the share of committed anti-Semites,
who answer a host of questions about attitudes toward Jews in
an extreme fashion, is 2–3 times higher than in the population as a
whole. Results also hold for average beliefs, and not just the share of
extremists; average views of Jews are much more negative among
those born in the 1920s and 1930s. Nazi indoctrination was most
effective where it could tap into preexisting prejudices; those born
in districts that supported anti-Semitic parties before 1914 show the
greatest increases in anti-Jewish attitudes. These findings demon-
strate the extent to which beliefs can be modified through policy
intervention. We also identify parameters amplifying the effective-
ness of such measures, such as preexisting prejudices.
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Schools, parents, and the media not only communicate infor-mation and teach skills, they transmit values and beliefs
as well (1). Dictatorships and democracies alike use schooling
in particular to influence the outlook of children and young
adults––the period of their lives during which humans are most
susceptible to outside influences. The efficiency of such inter-
ventions, ranging from mild attempts to modify attitudes to
“brainwashing,” is highly controversial (2–6). In particular, the
effect of schooling has remained doubtful (5–7). Whereas many
historians believe that Nazi propaganda and schooling prepared
the ground for the Third Reich’s excesses, scientific studies of
indoctrination have typically found few systematic effects (8, 9).
In this paper, we use modern-day data on anti-Semitic beliefs
in Germany to examine the effectiveness of indoctrination. Nazi
schooling and extracurricular activities sought to inculcate racial
hatred to an extraordinary extent. The entire curriculum––not
only biology classes––was used to convince the young of the im-
portance of race and the inferiority of Jews, blacks, etc. In addition
to compulsory school attendance, young Germans had to join the
Hitler Youth, where indoctrination continued; the official hand-
book for schooling the Hitler Youth devoted fully 45 out of 105
pages to racial ideology (10). Further, propaganda messages em-
bedded in books and films reinforced indoctrination (11).
Germans who grew up under the Nazi regime were therefore
exposed to a wide range of indoctrination methods. Using data
from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), we show
that these individuals are still markedly more anti-Semitic today
than cohorts born either before or after. They are more inclined
to deny Jews equal rights, to resent having them as neighbors or
family members, and they believe more often that Jews have too
much influence in the world. The creation of additional racial
bias varies by location. Where anti-Semitism was already prev-
alent before World War I (WWI), the Nazi message of racial
hatred produced many more zealots than elsewhere. This sug-
gests that indoctrination is particularly effective where it can
exploit preexisting stereotypes and beliefs (12), leading to a
“magnification effect.”
Data: Modern-Day Geographical Variation of anti-Semitic
Beliefs
Two waves of the General Social Survey for Germany (ALLBUS
1996 and 2006) asked a set of seven questions about attitudes
toward Jews (13, 14). For each of these questions, respondents
answered on a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 7; we recoded
the scale so that 7 is always the most anti-Semitic response. Table
1 shows the distribution of responses in the sample as a whole.
For example, 17% of German respondents felt that Jews
should blame themselves for their own persecution, 25.7% were
uncomfortable with the idea of a Jew marrying into their family,
and 21.5% felt that Jews should not have equal rights (scores of 5
or higher on a scale from 1 to 7).
Regional differences in attitudes across German regions are
large. The combined waves from the 1996 and 2006 surveys
contain data from 5,300 respondents in 264 towns or cities. [We
restrict the sample to individuals whose parents and grandpar-
ents are German. Altogether, there are 6,800 respondents in the
1996 and 2006 waves of the survey.] SI Appendix, Fig. S1 shows
the percentage of people who do not agree with the statement
that “Jews living in Germany should have equal rights with
Germans in all respects” (response of 5 or higher). For example,
only 10% of respondents in Hamburg disagreed. At the other
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Attempts at modifying public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs
range from advertising and schooling to “brainwashing.” Their
effectiveness is highly controversial. We demonstrate that
Nazi indoctrination––with its singular focus on fostering racial
hatred––was highly effective. Germans who grew up under the
Nazi regime are much more anti-Semitic today than those born
before or after that period. These findings demonstrate that
beliefs can be modified massively through policy intervention.
We also show that it was probably Nazi schooling that was most
effective, and not radio or cinema propaganda. Where schooling
could tap into preexisting prejudices, indoctrination was partic-
ularly strong. This suggests that confirmation bias may play an
important role in intensifying attitudes toward minorities.
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end of the spectrum, 48% of people surveyed in Lower Bavaria
(Niederbayern) felt that way––a concentration of anti-Jewish
sentiment almost five times higher than in Hamburg. Other ques-
tions––whether respondents would accept a Jewish family member,
a Jewish neighbor, or about the influence of Jews in the world––
show similarly high dispersions of beliefs at the regional level.
Our study analyzes data using city-level information. The
ALLBUS sensitive geographical data contain information on the
place of residence of each respondent (15). Based on the seven
questions in the ALLBUS general survey covering attitudes to-
ward Jews, we construct a composite measure of anti-Semitism––
the average across the seven questions listed in Table 1. We refer
to this measure as “broad anti-Semitism” (ASbroad). One quarter of
the German population holds mildly or strongly negative views of
Jews according to this measure (corresponding to an average re-
sponse of 4 or higher; the distribution is depicted in SI Appendix,
section A.2). Responses are also highly correlated; for example,
areas in which respondents do not want a Jewish neighbor are more
likely to deny them equal rights, too, and they believe that Jews
have too much influence in the world (SI Appendix, section A.3).
In addition to using average responses, we also analyze the
share of individuals with consistent, strong, negative views. We
define committed anti-Semites (AScomm) as respondents who
answer with 6 or more on each of three questions that are only
asked about Jews in ALLBUS: “Do Jews have too much in-
fluence in the world?;” “Are Jews partly responsible for their
own persecution?;” and “Are Jews trying to exploit their victim
status for financial gain?” [The additional four questions that
enter our measure of broad anti-Semitism (Table 1) are not only
asked about Jews, but also about Turks, immigrants, and other
foreigners. Because our AScomm variable is derived only from the
three Jew-specific questions, it can also be interpreted as a more
narrow measure of anti-Semitism.] In Germany as a whole, some
4% of respondents are committed anti-Semites, according to this
definition. However, the measure varies substantially across lo-
cations: Nearly half of the 264 towns and cities in our sample do
not have any respondents in this category; at the opposite end of
the spectrum, in 1 out of every 10 locations, 15% or more of
respondents are committed anti-Semites.
Breeding Hatred
We analyze if growing up under Nazi rule had a lasting effect on
attitudes later in life using cohort-specific indoctrination in the
past as a source of identifying variation for present-day behavior
(16). We find that anti-Semitic attitudes are particularly pro-
nounced for ALLBUS respondents who grew up under the
Nazi regime.
Fig. 1 shows the share of committed anti-Semites (AScomm) by
birth decade from 1910 to 1980. There is a general downward
trend; people born later are on average less anti-Semitic. In ad-
dition, there is a striking outlier: about 10% of respondents from
the 1930s birth cohort show strongly anti-Semitic attitudes––
almost three times the percentage after 1950, and more than double
the percentage of the preceding and the next cohort. [At the end
of World War II (WWII), individuals from the 1930s cohort were
between 6 and 15 years old. Below, we show that our results are
robust to using the larger cohort born between 1920 and 1939,
who were between 6 and 25 years old at the end of WWII. We also
discuss why committed anti-Semitism is not unusually pronounced
among the 1920s cohort in Fig. 1––this is likely due to differential
selection of fervent Nazi supporters from this cohort into army
divisions that saw particularly high casualty rates.] The difference
in AScomm for the 1930s birth cohort is statistically highly signifi-
cant, as indicated by the 95% confidence intervals in the figure.
Regression results confirm these findings. Table 2 shows that
individuals in the cohort 1930–1939 have significantly more pro-
nounced anti-Semitic attitudes, even after controlling for personal
characteristics such as education or the perception of the eco-
nomic situation. According to our estimates in column 1, they are
5.8 percentage points more likely to be committed anti-Semites
than the individuals outside of this cohort, who have a proportion
of 3.6% of committed anti-Semites. In other words, those born in
the 1930s are approximately twice as likely to hold extreme anti-
Semitic beliefs (after controlling for individual characteristics). A
similar pattern holds when we restrict the sample to individuals
Table 1. Attitudes toward Jews in Germany, 1996/2006
Least anti-Semitic Most anti-Semitic
ALLBUS questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Do Jews have too much influence in the world? 30.4 12.5 10.3 19.7 10.5 7.5 9.2
Jews are responsible for their own persecution 44.4 14.7 7.5 16.3 7.5 4 5.5
Jews should have equal rights 36.5 13.4 10.6 18 8 6.2 7.3
I feel ashamed about German crimes against Jews 52.5 15.4 9.7 9.3 4.1 3.2 5.8
Jews exploit their victim status for their own advantage 14.6 11 8.8 20.1 13.2 12.2 20.3
How do you feel about a Jew marrying into your family? 8.5 8.1 8.8 49 8.9 6.6 10.2
How would you feel about having a Jewish neighbor? 13.6 12.7 11.4 50.4 4.7 3.4 3.7
The table summarizes attitudes toward Jews in Germany, as reflected in seven questions in two waves of the
ALLBUS survey in 1996 and 2006. The table gives the share of respondents in each category, where all answers
were ordered so that 1 = least anti-Semitic and 7 = most anti-Semitic. Rows sum to 100%.
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Fig. 1. Share of committed anti-Semites by birth decade. Source: ALLBUS
data. The figure shows the proportion of respondents who answer with 6 or
more (on a scale of 7) on each of three Jew-specific questions asked in
ALLBUS: “Do Jews have too much influence in the world?,” “Are Jews partly
responsible for their own persecution?,” and “Are Jews trying to exploit
their victim status for financial gain?”
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born before 1950 (column 2) and when analyzing broad anti-
Semitism instead (columns 4 and 5). For the latter, the 1930–1939
birth cohort shows values that are 0.35 points higher on a scale
from 1 to 7 (and relative to an average of 3.15 for all other co-
horts). Results are also very similar when we repeat the analysis
for the broader birth cohorts 1920–1939 (columns 3 and 6).
In SI Appendix, section A.4, we examine the 1920s and 1930s
cohorts separately. Cohorts born in the 1920s were also exposed
to Nazi indoctrination. We find that they similarly show higher
shares of average anti-Semitic beliefs (ASbroad). This pattern
holds for men and women. The 1920s cohort also shows a signi-
ficantly higher share of committed anti-Semites (AScomm) among
women. The one group for which there is no effect for the 1920s
cohort are male extremists. We argue that these were more likely
to become war casualties. Many young fanatic Nazi supporters
volunteered for the Waffen-SS, which had particularly high ca-
sualty rates. We show that in places with more anti-Semitic ac-
tivity, fewer men born in the 1920s survived and entered our
sample (SI Appendix, section A.4). [To proxy for the extent of
anti-Semitic activity in the 1920s and 30s, we use measures from
ref. 17 for anti-Semitic actions and violence: attacks on synagogues,
deportations of Jews, anti-Semitic letters to the Nazi pamphlet Der
Stürmer, and pogroms against Jews.]
In combination, these results suggest that Nazi indoctrination––in
school, through propaganda, and in youth organizations––successfully
instilled strongly anti-Semitic attitudes in the cohorts that grew up
under the Nazi regime, and that the differential effect is still visible
today, more than half a century after the fall of the Third Reich.
The strength of effects for the 1930s cohort may be surprising;
children born in 1939 were only 6 y old in 1945. However, results in
social psychology show high levels of ethnocentric bias at early
ages. Studies from several countries demonstrate that preschool
children already exhibit in-group favoritism and out-group dislike
(18–21). In addition, memoirs of Germans who grew up under the
Nazis speak eloquently of how as early as age 5 and 6, they were
being indoctrinated in nationalist ideology and racial hatred (22,
23). [Alfons Heck, who rose to a high position in the Hitler Youth
before the end of the war, describes how “we five- and six-year olds
knew nothing of the freedom. . .of the Weimar Republic. More
than any other political party, the NSDAP recognized that those
who control the children own the future. We swallowed our daily
dose of nationalistic instruction as naturally as our morning milk.”]
Amplifying Prejudice. What made Nazi indoctrination so power-
ful? In the following, we examine two competing explanations:
(i) the extent to which Nazi propaganda confirmed preexisting
prejudices among the local population, and (ii) regional variation
in the implementation of Nazi indoctrination efforts, proxied by
media exposure and the strength of the Nazi party organization.
We find strong evidence for the former but much less for the
latter, lending support to theories that emphasize the importance
of confirmation bias in shaping attitudes and beliefs (24).
Schooling changed in character everywhere, and historical
accounts emphasize the importance of this channel. In addition,
we examine interactions with preexisting anti-Jewish sentiment.
To this end, we compile data on voting behavior from the late
19th and early 20th century––long before the Nazis’ rise to power.
Soon after the founding of the German Empire in 1870, anti-
Semitism emerged as a political force. For example, a petition in
1881 urged the government to restrict immigration of Jews, ban
them from teaching professions and the army, and revoke their
emancipation and access to equal rights. It was signed by 265,000
supporters and presented to Chancellor Bismarck. From the 1890s
onward, political parties with an exclusively anti-Jewish agenda
competed in national elections. Although the anti-Semitic parties
never received a high share of the national vote, electoral support
exceeded 40% in some districts (see SI Appendix, section A.5
for details).
We combine historical voting records with the modern-day
survey data for all 264 locations in our sample. As indicators of
historical anti-Jewish sentiment, we use the average vote shares
of anti-Semitic parties between 1890 and 1912. As a first step, we
show that attitudes on average persisted in the same location––
where voters turned to anti-Jewish parties in the 1890s and
1900s, they are still much more anti-Semitic today. In Fig. 2, we
group all electoral districts according to the tercile of the vote
share for anti-Semitic parties between 1890 and 1912. [The data
are from six parliamentary elections over the period 1890–1912.
Anti-Semitic parties in these elections are classified according to
Schmädeke (25). We describe these parties in more detail in SI
Appendix, section A.5.] The long arm of the past is clearly visible
in the share of committed anti-Semites (Fig. 2, Left). In locations
that were in the lowest third of districts supporting anti-Semitic
parties before 1914, only a little more than 2% of respondents
are committed anti-Semites today. In places in the top third of
support for the anti-Semitic parties, this proportion rises to
nearly 8%, a fourfold increase compared with localities in the
bottom third of historical support for anti-Semitic parties. These
differences are statistically highly significant, as indicated by the
95% confidence intervals. In Fig. 2 (Right), we confirm this
Table 2. Anti-Semitic attitudes by birth cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Committed anti-Semitism (ASbroad) Broad measure of anti-Semitism (ASbroad)
Birth cohorts All Pre-1950 All All Pre-1950 All
1930–1939 birth 0.0575*** 0.0386*** 0.350*** 0.200***
Cohort (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0496) (0.0546)
1920–1939 birth 0.0444*** 0.367***
Cohort (0.00914) (0.0447)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,452 2,036 4,452 4,286 1,952 4,286
R2 0.029 0.034 0.027 0.099 0.072 0.104
The table gives coefficient estimates and SEs (in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level), for
regressions of modern-day anti-Semitism on birth cohort dummies and control variables. * indicates significance
at the P < 0.1 level, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Dependent variable in columns 1–3 is AScomm (the proportion of
subjects with committed anti-Semitic attitudes), and in columns 4–6, ASbroad (the average of the seven variables
listed in Table 1, reflecting broad anti-Semitism). “Controls” include a constant term, individual-level sex, high
school, and university degree dummies, a dummy for the Soviet occupation zone, and a variable on how each
respondent judges the current economic situation (on a scale from 1 to 5). We also control for (ln) city population
and its share of foreigners in 2008, and for a dummy for the second wave of the survey (2006). All regressions
include only subjects with German nationality and at least two generations of German ancestors.
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pattern for broad anti-Semitism (ASbroad). Attitudes in Germany
today are markedly more negative toward Jews in towns and
cities in the upper third of historical support for anti-Jewish
parties, compared with the lowest third, as indicated by the 20%
higher average score.
Table 3 examines these patterns statistically, using pre-WWI
voting for anti-Semitic parties as an explanatory variable. Be-
cause anti-Semitic parties were typically small, they did not put
forward candidates in all cities for all elections. To deal with the
resulting missing vote shares, we present results for three different
samples. Sample (a) includes all cities, treating those without anti-
Semitic candidates as zero votes [thus sample (a) implicitly assumes
that where anti-Semitic parties before WWI did not put forward
candidates, they would have won zero (or very few) votes]; sample
(b) drops these observations; and sample (c) only includes cities
where anti-Semitic parties presented candidates in at least three
out of the six elections between 1890 and 1912. Thus, by going
from sample (a) to (c), we use increasingly precise information
on pre-WWI anti-Semitism. However, this comes at the cost of
sample size: the number of cities falls from 264 in sample (a) to
160 in sample (b), and to 46 in sample (c). [SI Appendix, section
A.5 shows the distribution of vote shares for anti-Semitic parties
for the three samples.]
We present results with and without controls. The latter include
several individual- and city-level characteristics, including age,
education, city size, and the share of foreigners living in a location,
as well as historical city characteristics. We find strong and sig-
nificant effects of historical anti-Semitism in all specifications, for
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Fig. 2. Contemporaneous individual-level anti-Semitic attitudes and historic voting patterns. (A) Share of committed anti-Semites (individuals answering 5 or
higher on three specific Jew-related questions); (B) Average of our broad anti-Semitism measure (on a scale from 1 to 7, with 7 the most anti-Semitic). Data
are grouped into terciles based on electoral support for anti-Semitic parties in the period 1890–1912. The lines with whiskers represent the 95% confidence
intervals. Overall, the two figures show that modern-day anti-Semitism is consistently and significantly greater in areas with higher levels of historical
electoral support for anti-Jewish parties.
Table 3. Persistence of anti-Semitism at the city level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Committed anti-Semites (AScomm) Broad anti-Semitism (ASbroad)
ASVote 0.966** 0.863** 1.005** 1.535** 0.969** 1.007*** 0.850** 1.292***
(2.02) (2.19) (2.12) (2.03) (2.32) (2.92) (2.51) (2.70)
Standard coefficient† [0.7%] [0.9%] [1.0%] [2.1%] [0.07] [0.11] [0.10] [0.18]
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Sample (a) (b) (b) (c) (a) (b) (b) (c)
N (individual) 4,802 3,105 2,594 806 4,622 2,996 2,504 921
N (cities) 264 160 41 47 264 160 141 47
R2 0.004 0.010 0.137 0.226
The table gives coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level), for regressions of modern-day anti-Semitism on the
historical vote share of anti-Semitic parties. * indicates significance at the P < 0.1 level, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Columns 1–4 use Probit regressions, where the
indicator variable AScomm is the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic attitudes, defined as individuals who score at least 6 (on a scale of 7) for all
variables Influence, Exploit, and Responsible. Columns 5–8 use OLS regressions. ASbroad is the average of seven variables, reflecting broad anti-Semitism. The
explanatory variable ASVote is the average vote for anti-Semitic parties in six parliamentary elections between 1890 and 1912. Sample (a) includes all cities,
treating those where the party did not put forward candidates as zero votes; sample (b) drops these observations; and sample (c) only includes cities where
anti-Semitic parties presented candidates in at least three out of the six elections. Controls include individual-level high school and university degree
dummies, age and age squared, a dummy for the Soviet occupation zone, and a variable on how each respondents judges the current economic situation
(on a scale from 1 to 5). We also control for (ln) city population, the share of foreigners in each city, and a dummy for the second wave of the survey (2006). In
addition, controls include city-level characteristics in 1925: the share of Protestants, the share of Jews, the shares of workers in industry and agriculture, the
share of self-used in retail and trade (typical Jewish professions), and the share of blue-collar workers. All regressions include only subjects with German
nationality and at least two generations of German ancestors.
†Standardized coefficient: shows the change in the dependent variable due to a 1-SD change in ASVote. In columns 1–4, the effect is expressed in percentage
points (of committed anti-Semites, who account on average for 4.8% of the population); in columns 5–8, it is relative to a mean of 3.12 for broad anti-
Semitism.
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both the share of extremists in a location (columns 1–4) and av-
erage levels of Jew-hatred (columns 5–8). To illustrate the mag-
nitude of effects, we compute how much the dependent variable
changes in response to a 1-SD increase in the vote share of pre-
WWI anti-Semitic parties. Such an increase goes hand-in-hand with
a rise of 0.7–2.1% in the share of committed anti-Semites (relative
to a sample average of 4.8%), and it is associated with a broad anti-
Semitism score today that is 0.07–0.18 points higher (equivalent to
6–16% of an SD). The results hold across all possible definitions of
the relevant sample. [SI Appendix, section A.6 shows that this also
holds if we restrict the sample to individuals born after 1945.]
Having shown that anti-Semitism persisted locally in Germany
throughout the 20th century, we analyze the extent to which
preexisting anti-Semitic sentiment (i) favored Nazi indoctri-
nation, and (ii) was, in turn, reinforced during the Nazi regime.
In Table 4, we regress individual-level measures of committed
and broad Jew-hatred on the share of voters for anti-Semitic
parties pre-1914, a birth decade dummy, and an interaction ef-
fect between these two variables. The interaction effect reflects
whether Nazi indoctrination was particularly effective in regions
with a history of anti-Semitic sentiment. We find strong support
for a magnification effect, for both committed and broad anti-
Semitism (columns 1 and 4). This pattern also holds when we
add control variables (columns 2 and 5), and when defining the
longer period 1920–1939 as the birth years exposed to Nazi in-
doctrination (columns 3 and 6).
These findings illustrate the extent to which Nazi indoctri-
nation reinforced local persistence of anti-Semitism. Approxi-
mately 17% of the individuals in our sample belong to the birth
cohort 1930–1939. Thus, the interaction term in our baseline
specification with controls (column 2) implies a total coefficient
on ASvote of 0.0438+0.17 × 0.399 = 0.11, i.e., more than double
the coefficient for other cohorts (0.0438). [The results in Table 4
are obtained using the full sample (a) from Table 3. In SI Ap-
pendix, section A.7, we show that results are very similar when
using samples (b) or (c). Also, because interaction effects cannot
be readily interpreted in Probit models, we run ordinary least
square (OLS) regressions throughout, including for committed
anti-Semitism.] In addition, we show that in towns and cities where
indoctrination was most effective––and the share of extremists in
the 1930s cohort is particularly high––there is markedly higher
anti-Semitism also among those born after 1945, 1955, 1965, and
even after 1975 (SI Appendix, section A.6). [This is true even after
controlling for historical anti-Semitism. This implies that effective
indoctrination in the 1930s created an “echo effect,” with the
share of committed anti-Semites higher than one would expect
based on historical anti-Semitism alone.] These findings suggest
that by reinforcing preexisting racial hatred, Nazi indoctrination
contributed importantly to the long-term persistence of anti-
Semitism in Germany. And conversely, the strong interaction with
preexisting attitudes suggests that confirmation bias played an
important role in shaping anti-Semitic beliefs.
We also examine other possible explanations for the success of
Nazi indoctrination. Youth growing up in 1930s Germany were
also exposed to propaganda in school and the National Socialist
(NS) youth organizations (both were universal across Nazi
Germany); the “modern” media film and radio also had a de-
cidedly anti-Semitic slant (but their coverage varied by region).
Similarly, the local strength of Nazi party organization may have
fostered indoctrination, while suppressing voices from the oppo-
sition. To evaluate the relative importance of these proxies for the
local intensity of propaganda, we exploit their regional variation.
We use data on the number of radio subscribers, cinema seats, and
of Nazi party members on a per-capita basis in each city. The data
and results are described in detail in SI Appendix, section A.8. We
find that these variables have no predictive power for the addi-
tional rise in anti-Semitism among the cohorts who grew up under
the Nazis (effects are insignificant, with tight confidence intervals
around zero). This suggests that––at least among the impres-
sionable young cohorts––spatial variation in the intensity of pro-
paganda was of minor importance, relative to the huge and
universal indoctrination in schools and youth organizations.
In contrast, we have shown that regional variation in pre-WWI
anti-Semitic votes is strongly associated with indoctrination. This
suggests that broad compatibility of Nazi ideology with preex-
isting beliefs was important. Our results provide empirical sup-
port for Goebbels’ famous argument that propaganda can only
be effective if it is broadly in line with preexisting notions
and beliefs (26). These findings suggest that the universal Nazi
indoctrination in schools and youth organizations was highly
effective, and especially so if it could build on preexisting anti-
Semitic prejudices.
Table 4. Amplifying preexisting anti-Semitism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Committed anti-Semites (AScomm) Broad anti-Semitism (ASbroad)
Birth cohorts dummy (Db) 1930–1939 1920–1939 −1930–1939– 1920–1939
ASvote 0.0757 0.0438 0.0593 0.617 0.604 0.542
(0.0521) (0.0622) (0.0678) (0.399) (0.373) (0.370)
Db 0.0479*** 0.0431*** 0.0364*** 0.332*** 0.285*** 0.317***
(0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0106) (0.0543) (0.0554) (0.0503)
Db × ASvote 0.333** 0.399** 0.193** 2.102*** 2.028*** 1.578***
(0.153) (0.163) (0.0875) (0.566) (0.611) (0.553)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 4,802 4,150 4,150 4,622 3,993 3,993
R2 0.015 0.043 0.039 0.022 0.117 0.122
SEs in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level). *P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Dependent variable
in columns 1–3 is AScomm (the proportion of subjects with committed anti-Semitic attitudes), and in columns 4–6,
ASbroad (the average of the seven variables listed in Table 1, reflecting broad anti-Semitism). Controls include a
constant term, individual-level sex, high school, and university degree dummies, a dummy for the Soviet occu-
pation zone, and a variable on how each respondent judges the current economic situation (on a scale from 1 to
5). We also control for (ln) city population and its share of foreigners in 2008, and for a dummy for the second
wave of the survey (2006). In addition, controls include city-level characteristics in 1925: the share of Protestants,
the share of Jews, the shares of workers in industry and agriculture, the share of self-used in retail and trade
(typical Jewish professions), and the share of blue-collar workers. All regressions include only subjects with
German nationality and at least two generations of German ancestors.
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Conclusions
Whereas a rich literature in economics has documented that
attitudes can persist a long time (27, 28), much less is known
about cultural change (7, 29, 30). Few governments in history
were more ambitious in their attempt to indoctrinate the pop-
ulation than the Nazi regime in Germany, and it particularly
focused on the young. Our findings demonstrate that beliefs of
Germans in their first decades of life were strongly malleable.
Using data on racial attitudes today, more than half a century
after the end of the Third Reich, we show that propaganda and
schooling were highly effective in changing attitudes and beliefs
of those growing up under the Nazis.
German racial beliefs show a high degree of persistence––
locations with a past of anti-Jewish voting even before WWI
are still markedly more anti-Semitic today. We also document a
magnification effect; Nazi schooling was particularly effective where
the population had previously held anti-Semitic beliefs. Nazi
propaganda and schooling increased the number of youngsters
who became fervent anti-Semites especially in those towns and
cities where Germans in the 1890s and 1900s had voted heavily in
favor of anti-Jewish parties. Conversely, where few Germans had
shown signs of racial hatred before WW I, Nazi indoctrination
made much smaller inroads into the collective psyche of the
young. As one former member of the Hitler Youth later put it:
“We who were born into Nazism never had a chance unless our
parents were brave enough to resist the tide and transmit their
opposition to their children. There were few of those” (23). This
finding is in line with a broader pattern of social interactions,
where attitudes and behaviors become more appealing the more
common they already are, leading to social multiplier effects
(31)––anti-Semitism among those subjected to Nazi education
became particularly attractive where it was compatible with
preexisting beliefs.
These findings have implications for our understanding of
culture more generally. The fact that Nazi indoctrination was
particularly effective in areas where anti-Semitic beliefs were
already widespread suggests that confirmation bias may play an
important role in intensifying attitudes toward minorities. This is
in line with models where beliefs overreact to new information
that confirms existing stereotypes (12). Thus, attitudes and be-
liefs may work as heuristic “rules of thumb” (32, 33) that help to
economize on cognitive resources in making costly decisions
under uncertainty (34).
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